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1. Introduction 
In the European Union (EU), regulatory tasks have been 
increasingly delegated to decentralized agencies since 
the 1990s (see e.g., Busuioc, Groenleer, & Trondal, 
2012). With the increasing “agencification” of policy 
making, normative questions regarding the legitimacy 
of EU agencies have become ever more important (see 
Rittberger & Wonka, 2011). This is particularly the case 
with regulatory agencies which are de facto decision 
makers without having de jure decision making powers 
(Gehring & Krapohl, 2007; Klika, Kim, & Versluis, 2013; 
Krapohl, 2004). The European Medicines Agency EMA 
and the European Food Safety Authority EFSA are well-
known cases. While these normative questions some-
what reflect the debate about the alleged democratic 
deficit of the EU, the issue of EU agency legitimacy is a 
special case of this debate. In general, agencies are 
special because technical tasks are delegated to insu-
late decision making processes from electoral cycles 
and partisan politics. Such insulation limits the legiti-
macy of agencies because they are, in contrast to gov-
ernments, not directly linked to democratic represen-
tation based on elections. In order to compensate for 
this limitation, agencies are expected to provide more 
effective problem solving (Majone, 1996). It is assumed 
that agencies are better able to process technical in-
formation, meaning that expertise, rather than demo-
cratic representation, is their main source of legitimacy 
(Sabatier, 1978; European Commission, 2008). 
In this article, I analyse the role of expertise and le-
gitimacy with regard to the European Chemicals Agen-
cy ECHA. The creation of the agency is based on the so-
called REACH regulation on industrial chemicals, which 
can be understood as the flagship of EU chemicals poli-
cy (European Parliament, & Council of the European 
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Union, 2006). REACH was adopted in December 2006, 
after a lengthy and controversial legislative process 
(e.g., Pesendorfer, 2006; Selin, 2007). Due to the com-
plexities of chemicals policy, REACH combines different 
regulatory instruments and ECHA has varying tasks re-
lated to these instruments. The analysis here is re-
stricted to the authorisation procedure dealing with so-
called Substances of Very High Concern (SVHCs). As a 
first step, I will analyse the role of ECHA in this proce-
dure and then I proceed to answer two research ques-
tions: How can we assess the legitimacy of EU agency 
decision making and to what extent is decision making 
in the REACH authorisation procedure legitimate? After 
the conceptual discussion, I present empirical material 
supporting the argument that agencies have the poten-
tial of increasing the legitimacy of decision making 
based on set rules and procedures. However, decision 
making processes in the authorisation procedure are 
characterized by insufficient legitimacy because such 
rules and procedures have been altered during the im-
plementation of the authorisation procedure. As a re-
sult, and regardless of concrete decision outcomes, vi-
tal aspects of legitimacy such as inclusiveness and 
transparency are negatively affected, which in turn re-
duces the acceptability of these outcomes for multiple 
stakeholders. 
A vast literature, in the natural sciences, law as well 
as political science, deals with the highly controversial 
legislative process and the governance arrangements 
enshrined in REACH. Yet, in-depth analyses of how de-
cision making unfolds in the implementation of REACH 
by and through ECHA is still relatively patchy, despite 
increasing scholarly attention (see e.g., Bergkamp, 
2013; Lee, 2014a; Ossege, 2014; Scott, 2009; Stokes & 
Vaughan, 2013). Hence, this article contributes to this 
literature by presenting empirical evidence of imple-
menting the REACH authorisation procedure. The anal-
ysis draws on legislative texts, a wide range of policy 
documents, technical guidance and minutes of the re-
spective ECHA decision making bodies. In order to in-
crease the validity of the analysis, the documentary ev-
idence is complemented by semi-structured interviews 
with policy makers, experts and stakeholders. In order 
to ensure reliability, the selection of interviewees was 
based on the set of actors which are formally entitled 
to make decisions in the authorisation procedure, i.e., 
the Member States (MS), the European Commission 
(COM) as well as ECHA. In addition, interviews were 
held with representatives of stakeholder organisations 
(STO), the European Parliament and experts on EU 
chemicals policy (EXP). The interviews are cited in-text 
with the acronyms given and numbered in case of mul-
tiple respondents. The empirical evidence and analysis 
cover a crucial period (as explained below)—from mid-
2008 to the end of 2012—regarding the implementa-
tion of REACH. 
2. The Case of ECHA and the Authorisation of 
Substances of Very High Concern 
At the core of EU chemicals policy is the classification 
of hazardous substances (see e.g., Heyvaert, 1999), i.e., 
substances that might be toxic, carcinogenic or persist-
ing in the environment. In the regulatory regime prior 
to REACH (henceforth the old regime), thousands of 
hazardous substances have been classified at the EU 
level. Today, these substances are listed in the regula-
tion on Classification, Labelling and Packaging (CLP), a 
complementary regulation to REACH (European Par-
liament, & Council of the European Union, 2008). The 
list of classified substances is regularly updated 
through procedures laid down in the CLP regulation. In 
REACH terminology, hazardous substances are referred 
to as Substances of Very High Concern (SVHCs). Three 
types of SVHCs are distinguished (Art. 57 REACH): car-
cinogens, mutagens and substances toxic for reproduc-
tion (CMRs), substances persisting and accumulating in 
the environment (PBTs), as well as substances of 
equivalent concern (ECs). The authorisation procedure 
aims to ensure the good functioning of the internal 
market, while assuring that risks of SVHCs are properly 
controlled (Art. 55 REACH). This means that certain in-
dustrial uses of SVHCs might be banned due to their 
risks, yet without overly harming the chemicals indus-
try that would have to substitute these substances for 
suitable alternatives. 
In addition to classification, the old regime already 
entailed the possibility to limit the use of hazardous 
substances through legislative restrictions. To this end, 
Member States’ regulatory authorities had the respon-
sibility to conduct extensive risk assessment on priori-
tized substances, which then had to be endorsed by 
various expert committees. This cumbersome proce-
dure put the burden of proof regarding substances’ risk 
on Member States’ regulatory authorities. Decision 
making not only suffered from such cumbersome pro-
cedures, but also from limited availability of infor-
mation. Under the old regime, there was little incentive 
for companies to supply technical information and con-
tribute to efficient risk assessment. It was therefore 
seen as a failure because even if the risk assessment 
concluded the existence of risk, the use of hazardous 
substances was hardly ever restricted as a direct result 
of the assessment process (European Commission, 
1998). Although REACH has retained the instrument of 
restrictions (see Art. 67-73 REACH), the very existence 
of the authorisation procedure in REACH is intrinsically 
related to this failure. By giving companies the respon-
sibility to conduct risk assessment on hazardous sub-
stances, the procedure aims to facilitate regulatory de-
cision making by reversing the burden of proof (see 
Chapman, 2007, p. 69; European Commission, 2001; 
Koch & Ashford, 2006, p. 40). 
 Politics and Governance, 2015, Volume 3, Issue 1, Pages 128-138 130 
To this end, the procedure consists of two stages. 
First, SVHCs are included in the so-called Candidate 
List. The inclusion of SVHCs requires companies to 
communicate information about products containing 
the substance (Art. 7 & 33 REACH). Second, SVHCs in 
the Candidate List are selected for eventual inclusion in 
Annex XIV of REACH. As soon as a substance is included 
in Annex XIV, companies wishing to use it in industrial 
processes need to apply for authorisation. The burden 
of proof is reversed insofar as companies applying for 
authorisation need to conduct extensive risk assess-
ment for specific uses of substances for which authori-
sations are applied for.1 Decision making at both stages 
can be distinguished as hazard-based at the first stage, 
i.e., SVHC inclusion in the Candidate List, and risk-
based at the second stage, i.e., SVHC inclusion in Annex 
XIV (see Hansen & Blainey, 2006). The hazard-based in-
clusion means that substances can be identified as 
SVHCs based on their molecular structure, i.e., their in-
trinsic properties. If a substance is in line with the SVHC 
criteria laid down in REACH Article 57, no additional in-
formation is needed to include the substance in the 
Candidate List. The risk-based inclusion means that sub-
stances are selected for Annex XIV not only because of 
their intrinsic properties, their hazard, but also because 
of the volume and uses of the substance, as well as ex-
posure data for certain populations (Art. 58 REACH). Alt-
hough risk-based selection falls short of full-fledged risk 
assessment, decision making is more complex since ad-
ditional information needs to be processed to make such 
selections. Since this information is meant to give an in-
dication of the level of risk, the selection of SVHCs from 
the Candidate List is referred to as prioritisation. 
Since ECHA has a fairly common organisational 
structure for EU agencies, I here discuss only those de-
cision making bodies that are essential for the authori-
sation procedure. In order to include a substance as 
SVHC in the Candidate List, it first needs to be pro-
posed. This can be done by each Member State and the 
Commission (Art. 58). If a substance is proposed as 
SVHC, a respective dossier needs to be submitted; in 
the case of the Commission, it is ECHA that submits a 
dossier on behalf of the Commission. A proposed sub-
stance is then included in the Candidate List by the 
Member State Committee (MSC) (Art. 59 REACH). The 
MSC is an ECHA body that is composed of national rep-
resentatives, one per Member State, usually from the 
national regulatory authority dealing with chemicals 
(see Art. 85 REACH). The MSC, however, is not a clear-
cut technical committee; although it consists of experts 
from national regulatory authorities, it is political in the 
sense that national interests are explicitly represented 
                                                          
1 In this article, I deal only with the inclusion of SVHCs in An-
nex XIV and not actual applications for authorisations. In the 
time period covered by the empirical analysis, mid-2008 until 
the end of 2012, no authorisations were submitted. 
in committee deliberations (see ECHA, 2010). As such, 
those nominated for the committee are wearing differ-
ent “hats”, being simultaneously members of an agen-
cy committee, policy experts and representatives of 
national interests (Egeberg & Trondal, 2007). 
Regarding the prioritisation of SVHCs, ECHA is enti-
tled to select substances from the Candidate List and 
recommend priority substances for Annex XIV inclu-
sion; by doing so, ECHA has to take into account the 
opinion of the MSC (Art. 58 REACH). Prioritisation is ac-
companied by consultation, whereby stakeholders are 
invited to submit comments on the prioritised substanc-
es. The recommendation, including the prioritised sub-
stances, is then sent to the Commission which is entitled 
to include SVHCs in Annex XIV by way of comitology 
(Art. 133 REACH). This article refers to the respective 
comitology legislation and specifies that decisions on 
Annex XIV inclusion are to be made through the regulato-
ry procedure with scrutiny. The new system of delegated 
and implementing acts brought about by the Lisbon Trea-
ty, and replacing the system of comitology, has not yet af-
fected these provisions and, for the time being, decisions 
are made in line with the old comitology system. 
3. Conceptual Framework 
A popular framework of analysis regarding EU agency le-
gitimacy is the distinction between input and output le-
gitimacy (see Scharpf, 1999; also Borrás, Koutalakis, & 
Wendler, 2007; Griller & Orator, 2010; Krapohl, 2008; 
Weimer, 2008). Input legitimacy refers to the institu-
tional arrangements of political systems that ensure 
equal participation through elections and subsequent 
chains of delegation to governments and administrative 
bodies. Output legitimacy refers to effective problem 
solving in the sense that policy outcomes meet citizens’ 
preferences. An important part of the scholarly debate is 
the question of whether input and output legitimacy are 
positively or negatively correlated, i.e., whether decreas-
ing input legitimacy necessarily leads to increasing out-
put legitimacy, and vice versa, or whether both forms of 
legitimacy are mutually reinforcing (see e.g., Bellamy, 
2010). This fundamental question, to which I don’t give a 
general answer, provides an important backdrop for the 
argument developed in this section. Drawing on a con-
ceptual discussion of the input-output framework, and 
in reference to my earlier question regarding assessing 
the legitimacy of EU agency decision making, I argue that 
throughput legitimacy is the better normative standard 
(see Schmidt, 2013). 
Generally, agencies are created with certain expec-
tations relating to their ability to process technical in-
formation and produce more effective policy out-
comes. The decrease of input legitimacy is accepted, 
because agencies promise increased output legitimacy, 
which in certain political systems or policy areas make 
agency creation more desirable or even feasible (Ma-
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jone, 1996; Scharpf, 1999). Hence, while advocates of 
input legitimacy stress the importance of equal partici-
pation for every citizen, even at the risk of producing 
sub-optimal policy outcomes, advocates of output le-
gitimacy stress the problem solving capacities of ex-
perts (see Bellamy, 2010). Hence, if one were to sub-
scribe to the assumption of negative correlation 
between input and output legitimacy, a causal relation 
could be established, generating clear theoretical ex-
pectations. If input legitimacy increases, output legiti-
macy decreases, and vice versa. This expectation has 
been shown to hold with regard to the European Medi-
cines Agency EMA and the European Food Safety Au-
thority EFSA (Krapohl, 2008). While the causal relation 
generating theoretical expectations is rather straight-
forward, there remains a problem of measurement 
which does not only affect the conceptual foundation 
of the input-output model. If the seemingly solid con-
ceptual foundation becomes fragile, it also questions 
normative arguments which are based on the input-
output model and specifically the emphasis on effec-
tive problem solving as output legitimacy. 
The normative standard of output legitimacy accepts 
decreasing input legitimacy not only for practical rea-
sons, but also because it is believed that agencies’ ex-
pertise will lead to more effective policy outcomes. To 
this end, participation in decision making processes, in 
contrast to elections as a form of input legitimacy, can 
be limited to experts capable of giving well-informed jus-
tifications for decisions. This means that, whereas public 
participation through elections does not require deliber-
ation per se, expert decision making is intrinsically relat-
ed to deliberation and sophisticated reasoning (Moore, 
2014, p. 67). This is why some scholars advocate that 
certain issues are left to experts since citizens are nei-
ther capable of nor interested in partaking in such deci-
sion making processes. If expert decision making then 
meets these citizens’ preferences, output legitimacy is 
given. Yet, advocating expert decision making hinges on 
the assumption of unequivocal standards of output legit-
imacy, i.e., policy outcomes meeting citizens’ prefer-
ences effectively. The problem here is that even highly 
technical problems imply an array of possibly conflicting 
preferences among multiple actors regarding policy out-
comes. If these actors hold conflicting preferences on 
such outcomes, invoking output legitimacy as a normative 
argument is problematic, because objective measurement 
of policy effectiveness is inevitably skewed. In order to 
evade problems of measuring output legitimacy, scholars 
have applied indicators derived from accountability con-
cepts (see Kraphol, 2008). While such indicators allow 
for instructive empirical analysis, the question remains 
whether they actually measure output legitimacy. 
A similar observation can be made regarding input 
legitimacy, given that some of the indicators used to 
assess input legitimacy seem to address decision mak-
ing processes by and through EU agencies (see Borrás 
et al., 2007; Krapohl, 2008). Yet, understanding input 
legitimacy more in terms of delegating chains by which 
electorates or governments delegate tasks to repre-
sentative or administrative bodies respectively, seems 
at odds with these indicators. Alternatively, the in-
volvement of the European Parliament (EP) in the act 
of secondary legislation that delegates tasks to the 
agency has been used as an indicator of input legitima-
cy (Krapohl, 2008). The assumption being that the ap-
plication of the former co-decision procedure, and cur-
rent ordinary legislative procedure, increases input 
legitimacy due to the involvement of the EP, given that 
there is a clear chain of delegation from the basic legit-
imation through elections to a delegating act at the EU 
level. However, agencies have been increasingly creat-
ed by secondary legislation involving both the EP and 
the Member States in the Council. Moreover, after years 
of intensive discussions, EU institutions finally agreed on 
a common approach regarding the creation and opera-
tion of agencies, which, for the time being, concluded 
the struggle for a systematic framework of EU agencies 
(see European Commission, 2008). As a result, input le-
gitimacy has lost some of its analytical meaning as nor-
mative criterion given that the EP, in the course of the 
legislative procedure, has often managed to amend del-
egating acts in its favour (Lord, 2011). 
Hence, due to the conceptual problems with the in-
put-output framework, I argue that throughput legiti-
macy is the better normative standard to assess the le-
gitimacy of decision making through EU agencies (see 
Schmidt, 2013). This standard seems promising, be-
cause regardless of the conceptual problems of the in-
put-output framework, the causal relation is compel-
ling and based on solid argumentation. At the heart of 
the matter here is the tension between expert decision 
making and democratic participation of the public (see 
Holst & Molander, 2014). While decision making in com-
plex societies has to rely on expertise to deal with tech-
nical difficulties, this also limits equal participation for 
the simple fact that not everybody is an expert on the is-
sue. This tension resonates with the question of whether 
input and output legitimacy are positively or negatively 
correlated. As Schmidt (2013, p. 3) notes, the concept of 
throughput legitimacy provides a better understanding 
of the input-output relation and is thus a normative 
standard that brings together the vast literature dealing 
with questions of decision making processes. 
The key question then is how limited access to deci-
sion making and democracy can be reconciled; or more 
specifically, what kind of organisational arrangements 
are required to ensure legitimate decision making by 
experts (Holst & Molander, 2014). In general, through-
put legitimacy refers to the rules and procedures by 
which decisions are made in and by organisations (Bek-
kers & Edwards, 2007; Majone, 1980). As Majone points 
out, a key feature of legitimate decision making is the 
acceptability of decision outcomes by citizens, or 
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stakeholders as intermediaries of societal interests in-
cluding citizens. It does not necessarily follow that con-
crete decision outcomes are indeed accepted by stake-
holders. Yet, as a normative standard, throughput 
legitimacy assesses the extent to which decision mak-
ing procedures can be accepted from a theoretical 
point of view (see also Schmidt, 2013, pp. 9-10). 
In line with Moore (2014, pp. 71-72), such accepta-
bility can be distinguished with regard to internal and 
external legitimacy. Internal legitimacy refers to accept-
ability by those who were part of the decision making 
process, hence “inside the room” as Moore puts it, and 
thus speaks to various indicators of throughput legitima-
cy identified in the literature, such as participation and 
consultation. External legitimacy refers to acceptability 
“outside the room” and thus speaks to indicators such as 
transparency and public justification. This distinction 
helps to further substantiate the argument that 
throughput legitimacy is the better normative standard 
of decision making processes. It allows for a fine-tuned 
analysis of the organisational structures of decision mak-
ing, and whether these structures facilitate the accepta-
bility of decision outcomes. Depending on the normative 
point of view, one might argue in favour of internal or 
external legitimacy, i.e., whether expert decision making 
should be acceptable to other actors inside the room or 
to stakeholders outside the room (see Holst & Mo-
lander, 2014; also Pedersen, 2014). 
Yet, a key feature of legitimate decision making is 
that the boundaries between those inside and outside 
the room are not entirely closed off (see Moore, 2014, 
pp. 72-74). If this were so, as Moore points out, “then 
what is left to those outside the room is only acclama-
tion or rejection” (Moore, 2014, p. 72). Hence, legiti-
mate decision making implies that decisions can be 
contested by those outside the room, even though in-
formally and infrequently, without completely remov-
ing the boundaries to expert decision making inside the 
room. Drawing on the boundary between internal and 
external legitimacy, I assess to what extent decision 
making is legitimate in the REACH authorisation proce-
dure. In the following empirical sections, it will be 
shown that legitimacy is insufficient because during the 
implementation process, boundaries have been re-
drawn in favour of internal legitimacy, thus reducing 
the acceptability of decision outcomes by multiple 
stakeholders. While a lack of inclusiveness and trans-
parency might be justified with a need for free deliber-
ation and discretionary decision making by experts, the 
implementation of the authorisation procedure does 
not live up to such deliberative norms. 
4. The Inclusion of SVHCs in the Candidate List and 
Annex XIV 
As mentioned before, three types of SVHCs are distin-
guished in Article 57 of REACH, i.e., CMR, PBT and EC 
substances. Regarding the three types, CMRs are the 
easiest to identify because their type is based on defini-
tive criteria. If the substance in question has received 
harmonised classification at the EU level, even in the old 
regime, and is, therefore, listed in the CLP as carcinogen-
ic, mutagenic or toxic for reproduction, it can already be 
known that the substance has SVHC properties. In con-
trast to CMRs, the identification of PBTs and ECs is more 
complex because their type is based on “open” criteria, 
i.e., a thorough examination of the substance is needed 
to determine its properties and the outcome of this de-
termination is not known in advance. Hence, it can be 
decided after such examination that the proposed sub-
stance does not fulfil PBT and EC criteria as laid down in 
REACH. As a result, there is no predetermined number 
of SVHCs which are known to be subject to the authori-
sation procedure. Shortly before the adoption of REACH, 
the Commission estimated that around 1,500 substanc-
es could be identified as SVHCs.2 Although almost thou-
sand substances were known to have SVHC properties 
before the adoption of REACH, in the process of imple-
mentation, from mid-2008 until the end of 2012, only a 
limited number of 138 SVHCs has been included in the 
Candidate List (see Table 1). The reason for this is an 
agreement between Member States and the Commis-
sion not to propose all substances known to be SVHCs. 
                                                          
2 The number is based on 900 substances known to have 
SVHC properties, whereas 600 were expected to emerge 
through the REACH requirement for the registration of all 
substances on the market; see European Commission (2006). 
Table 1. Number of SVHCs included in the candidate list, 2008 to 2012. 
Round Date No. of SVHCs included No. of SVHCs in the Candidate List 
1 October 2008 15 — 
2 January 2010 15 30 
3 June 2010 8 38 
4 December 2010 8 46 
5 June 2011 8 54 
6 December 2011 20 74 
7 June 2012 13 87 
8 December 2012 54 141 (138) 
Note: After the eighth round, 138 substances were included in the Candidate List. The number of decisions (141) is higher because for 
three substances the Member State Committee made a decision twice. Furthermore, the number of proposed substances is higher as 
well (145) because not all substances proposed were included. In the second round, one substance was formally included in March. 
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4.1. Candidate List 
The agreement of the Member States and the Commis-
sion can best be understood when contrasted with the 
demand voiced by the environmental and public health 
committee in the EP during the legislative process of 
REACH. The committee inserted an amendment that all 
substances known to have SVHC properties shall be in-
cluded in the Candidate List (European Parliament, 
2005). The amendment was rejected by the Council 
that insisted that SVHCs may be included (Council, 
2006). Hence, the agreement of the Member States 
and the Commission to not propose all known SVHCs 
entails two basic consequences. First, if not all known 
SVHCs shall be included; those that shall be included 
need to be identified first. As shown in Table 1, known 
SVHCs are not included at once, but in subsequent 
rounds with a varying number of substances. Unsur-
prisingly, this staggered approach was much criticized 
by NGOs, trade unions and members of the EP’s envi-
ronmental and public health committee (see e.g., 
Chemtrust et al., 2008; European Parliament, 2008, 
2010). According to these stakeholders, the limited 
number of proposed SVHCs only serves the interests of 
industries at the expense of human health and envi-
ronmental protection. In order to support such criti-
cism and raise awareness, various lists containing hun-
dreds of substances were created, applying the legal 
criteria of REACH, which could and should be included 
immediately.3 
Second, if not all known SVHC shall be included in 
the Candidate List; an approach is needed regarding 
specific substances and whether or not they shall be 
included. Since REACH does not contain any provisions 
in this respect, ECHA convened a workshop shortly af-
ter the first round of inclusion (ECHA, 2009a). The 
workshop was attended by representatives of the 
Member States and the Commission and the purpose 
of the workshop was to clarify which and how the 
known SVHCs shall be included in the Candidate List. 
To this end, an informal expert group, consisting of ex-
perts from six Member States (The Netherlands, Ger-
many, Sweden, Denmark, Austria and France), came up 
with a “source list” of known SVHCs from which sub-
stances could be eventually proposed for authorisa-
tion. It was also concluded that a coordinative frame-
work for decision making should be set up, in which 
Member States shall coordinate the decisions to pro-
pose specific SVHCs for the Candidate List. This frame-
work is referred to as Risk Management Options (RMO) 
analysis. The RMO aims to reflect on the effectiveness 
of various options to deal with a substance, and based 
on such reflection, a decision for one or the other regu-
latory instrument would be made. The main respective 
                                                          
3 See for instance the SIN list (“Substitute it now”), see 
www.sinlist.org. 
options are the regulatory instruments of REACH, thus 
authorisation and restriction of substances, as well as 
the option not to regulate a substance at all. In a nut-
shell, the RMO analysis aims to share information 
among Member States, and to coordinate national ac-
tivities regarding the proposal of substances for the au-
thorisation procedure. Another important reason for 
the set up of the RMO analysis concerns the role of the 
MSC regarding SVHC inclusion in the Candidate List. 
Formally, the MSC is entitled to include substances, 
yet the mandate is formulated as such that it can only 
make a decision based on the intrinsic properties of a 
substance, i.e., hazard-based inclusion (see ECHA, 
2007). This means that if a substance, which is known 
to have SVHC properties, is proposed by one Member 
State or the Commission, the MSC has de facto no 
choice but to include the substance in the Candidate 
List, even though one or more Member States in the 
committee might disagree. This applies mainly to 
CMRs, because they have received harmonised classifi-
cation, and are therefore listed in the CLP regulation. 
According to the REACH criteria on CMRs, existing 
harmonised classification cannot be challenged within 
the authorisation procedure. In fact, most of the 138 
substances in the Candidate List are CMRs for which 
harmonised classification had been agreed on before. 
4.2. Annex XIV 
In the time period covered by the empirical analysis, 22 
SVHCs have been included in Annex XIV, thus priori-
tised from 138 substances included in the Candidate 
List. In the implementation process, two inter-related 
features of the decision making appear noteworthy. 
First, it appears from the empirical evidence that ECHA, 
when making recommendations on prioritised sub-
stances, does not falter when faced with Member 
States’ opposition (see ECHA, 2011b; also ECHA, 
2011c). It regularly adjusts technical details of the rec-
ommendation in line with the set rules and procedures, 
yet substantial changes are not included in the recom-
mendations. In case of politically salient issues, Mem-
ber States’ opposition is then expressed as minority 
positions and attached to the opinion of the MSC. Sec-
ond, the Commission plays a crucial role here because 
it is entitled to transmit the agency recommendation in 
a draft regulation for comitology decision making. The 
22 substances included in Annex XIV until the end of 
2012 were based on three rounds of recommendations 
by ECHA in which 28 substances were prioritised. If the 
28 substances prioritised by ECHA represent 28 cases 
of decision making, the Commission has altered some 
technicalities pertaining to individual substances in the 
recommendation in 17 cases, i.e., in two-thirds of all 
cases. Hence, the Commission is not merely rubber-
stamping ECHA’s recommendation. 
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5. Discussion: What Kind of Legitimacy? 
In the conceptual discussion, it was argued that 
throughput legitimacy is the better normative standard 
to assess the legitimacy of decision making processes. 
A distinction was made between internal legitimacy, 
acceptability of decision outcomes by those inside the 
room, and external legitimacy, acceptability of decision 
outcomes by those outside the room. This distinction 
highlights the boundaries drawn between those inside 
and those outside the room, and thus allows for a fine-
tuned analysis of the organisational structures of deci-
sion making. While the empirical section presented the 
authorisation procedure in a linear structure, in this 
section I discuss the question of legitimate decision 
making based on the conceptual distinction between 
internal and external legitimacy. By doing so, I hope to 
show how the boundaries between internal and exter-
nal legitimacy have been redrawn, and why this re-
drawing negatively affects throughput legitimacy. 
5.1. Prospects of External Legitimacy in the REACH 
Authorisation Procedure 
A number of recitals and provisions of REACH refer to 
transparency and participation. In the authorisation 
procedure specifically, stakeholders such as industry 
associations, trade unions and NGOs are admitted to 
the meetings of the MSC as observers. The non-
confidential versions of the minutes are published and 
technical documentation of SVHCs proposals is also 
publicly available. Since the MSC is more than just an 
expert committee, if vital national interests are affect-
ed through SVHC proposals, controversies are brought 
into the open and minority opinions are made public 
(see ECHA, 2009b; ECHA, 2012). Although stakeholders 
have no formal say in the decision making, their scruti-
ny with regard to deliberative processes provides for 
external legitimacy, given that stakeholder organisa-
tions are assumed to represent those outside the 
room. However, in the majority of cases in which 
SVHCs are included in the Candidate List, the MSC does 
not deliberate. Since most of the 138 substances in-
cluded in the Candidate List are CMRs, the decision 
outcome is pre-determined and in many cases these 
substances are not even considered by the committee, 
but directly included. As a result, the prospect of the 
MSC as a deliberative forum is only truly materialized 
when PBT or EC substances are proposed for the Can-
didate List. These substances, however, are the minori-
ty of SVHCs in the Candidate List. 
The prioritisation of SVHCs for Annex XIV inclusion, 
likewise, is formally characterized by transparency and 
access of stakeholders. The methodology of the priori-
tisation, developed and revised together with Member 
States, is publicly available and each round of prioriti-
sation is accompanied by public consultation. If the 
prioritisation of ECHA is faced with Member States’ 
opposition, minority opinions are made public and EC-
HA provides extensive documentation, justifying deci-
sions on prioritisation (see ECHA, 2011a). While the pri-
oritisation of ECHA seems to support external legitimacy, 
the following step in the procedure, comitology decision 
making, is not as straightforward (e.g. Lee, 2014b). 
In the literature, comitology is sometimes seen as a 
specific form of supranational governance, in which de-
liberation prevails and factual arguments are more im-
portant than tit-for-tat bargaining (Joerges & Neyer, 
1997). However, comitology is also notoriously non-
transparent and largely excludes the EP, despite the 
right of scrutiny. As Blom-Hansen and Brandsma (2009) 
show, comitology decision making is not only charac-
terized by deliberative decision making by experts, but 
also by intergovernmental bargaining. Indeed, in two 
out of three rounds of Annex XIV inclusion, the Com-
mission proposal was adopted with a qualified majori-
ty, whereas only in one case, unanimity was achieved. 
This means that good arguments and deliberation are 
not always sufficient to aggregate Member States’ 
preferences. In some cases when national preferences 
are affected, voting is needed to make a decision. Thus, 
some of the rules and procedures which seem to pro-
vide external legitimacy, at both stages of the proce-
dure, are perceived by some actors as constraints. By 
invoking images of output legitimacy, these actors at-
tempt to redraw the boundaries between internal and 
external legitimacy. If this redrawing favours internal 
legitimacy over external legitimacy, this might turn 
constraints into opportunities. 
5.2. Redrawing Boundaries in Favour of Internal 
Legitimacy 
The set up of the RMO analysis is supposed to increase 
output legitimacy by deciding on the most effective in-
strument to deal with SVHCs. It might well be argued 
that SVHCs which are not used in high volumes or 
which are essential for certain industrial processes are 
better not proposed for the authorisation procedure; 
regulatory resources and expertise are better spent on 
priority substances. However, such reasoning does not 
meet NGOs’ and trade unions’ preferences. If it is as-
sumed that these actors legitimately represent citizens’ 
interests regarding environmental and human health, 
the limited inclusion of SVHCs in the Candidate List can 
hardly be seen as increasing output legitimacy. Moreo-
ver, since RMO is not mentioned in the legal provisions 
of REACH, Member States’ experts are meeting in the 
framework of a Commission expert group. To this 
group, neither industry nor NGOs have formal access 
and no supporting documentation regarding decision 
making is made public (European Commission, 2013).4 
                                                          
4 The RMO analysis is becoming increasingly formalised and 
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From the perspective of many Member States, the lack 
of inclusiveness and transparency is needed to ensure 
technical, non-political deliberation among experts 
(MS#1; see also Chemical Watch, 2011; European 
Commission, 2011). However, if boundaries are to be 
redrawn because the MSC does not provide the right 
forum of deliberation, it should not happen at the ex-
pense of external legitimacy. 
The RMO analysis is not only informal, but it is also 
not legally binding and neither Member States nor the 
Commission can be forced to coordinate their actions 
before submitting a proposal. After all, SVHC proposals 
are not merely technical issues, but reflect national in-
terests in getting particular groups of substances in the 
Candidate List (EXP; MS#4). Hence, not only does the 
RMO redraw boundaries towards internal legitimacy, 
the deliberative potential of internal legitimacy, for in-
stance through experts’ peer review, is not even fully 
realized. This is the case if no deliberation in the con-
text of RMO takes place. While this might change in the 
future, in the first years of REACH implementation, the 
lack of coordination and deliberation is obvious. Not 
only were the substances proposed without RMO anal-
ysis, but also some substances were discarded by some 
Member States only to be proposed by others (MS#2). 
In the eighth round of identification in 2012, the Com-
mission, which is a stern advocate of RMO, asked ECHA 
to propose more than thirty substances without con-
ducting RMOs (see Table 1). The perceived or claimed 
output legitimacy of RMO analysis is undermined in 
such cases, if the proposed substances were not of 
high priority (MS#3). Instead, the Commission asked 
ECHA to propose these substances in order to keep 
their political promise to have 136 substances in the 
Candidate List by the end of 2012 (COM#1; COM#2; al-
so Chemical Watch, 2010). 
At the stage of substance prioritisation, similar re-
drawing can be observed. It has been said that the 
Commission is not rubber-stamping ECHA recommen-
dations, given that in two thirds of all recommended 
substances, specific changes were made. In some cas-
es, substances opposed by Member States during pri-
oritisation were removed altogether from the recom-
mendation. Admittedly, it is the prerogative of the 
Commission to deviate from the agency recommenda-
tion when issuing draft regulations to the comitology 
committee. In the context of comitology decision mak-
ing, the Commission needs to garner broad support in 
the committee to ensure effective implementation at 
the national level (Joerges & Neyer, 1997). From this 
perspective, consultations with industry and Member 
States prior to formal decision making in comitology 
committees actually increases legitimacy, if such con-
                                                                                           
some documentation, albeit limited, might be released. 
These developments, however, are rather recent inventions 
beyond the scope of this article. 
sultation contributes to effective problem solving. Ac-
cordingly, the Commission in justifying their decisions 
invokes images of output legitimacy, as it is argued that 
other regulatory instruments than authorisation are 
more effective to deal with some of the substances 
(COM#1; also Herbatschek, Bergkamp, & Mihova, 
2013). However, similar to the RMO, boundaries are 
redrawn, because in contrast to public consultation 
and extensive deliberation of ECHA prioritisation, the 
decision making processes in the Commission are in-
formal and non-transparent. As a result, access to the 
Commission is crucial. While Member States were able 
to reiterate their opposition regarding the inclusion of 
contested substances (MS#3), NGOs claim that the 
Commission was also under heavy lobbying pressure 
from industry to remove these substances (NGO). 
However, the opposition by companies and Mem-
ber States is motivated by economic concerns for vital 
industries. Again, invoking images of output legitimacy 
is questionable, given the diverging preferences of 
NGOs and sometimes trade unions. Irrespective of the 
aforementioned conceptual problem of output legiti-
macy, arguing that the Commission relies on these 
consultations in order to profit from stakeholders’ ex-
pertise is unconvincing in the age of EU agencification. 
The rationale behind agencies’ creation is the expecta-
tion that they develop expertise that contributes to 
regulatory decision making. In the context of agency 
decision making, Member States’ experts and stake-
holder are involved in decision making processes ac-
cording to set rules and procedures. The redrawing of 
boundaries at the second stage of the authorisation 
procedure, however, favours those actors which have 
preferential access to the Commission, namely industry 
and salient Member States (EXP). This somewhat nulli-
fies the elaborate procedure of ECHA decision making 
which is based on inclusiveness, consultation and 
transparency. Although these procedures are not with-
out problems, from this perspective, the argument of 
Majone (2010) for strong EU agencies is appealing. Re-
gardless of whether one advocates expert decision 
making or inclusive participation, thus invoking output 
and input legitimacy respectively, decision making by 
and through agencies based on set rules and regula-
tions certainly increases throughput legitimacy. This 
seems of particular importance in policy areas in which 
output legitimacy is faced with limitations due to con-
flicting preferences and diverging perceptions of policy 
effectiveness. In set rules and procedures, boundaries 
between internal and external legitimacy are drawn 
and cannot be easily redrawn through informal pro-
cesses. 
6. Conclusions 
This article set out to assess the legitimacy of decision 
making in the REACH authorisation procedure. Based 
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on a discussion of the input-output framework of legit-
imacy, it was argued that throughput legitimacy is the 
better normative standard. This is particularly the case 
in highly contested policy areas, in which the notion of 
policy effectiveness defies objective standards of 
measurement. The adoption of REACH came about af-
ter a controversial legislative process, due to compet-
ing preferences on industrial competitiveness versus 
human health and environmental protection. The intri-
cacies of decision making in the authorisation proce-
dure are the result of these competing preferences. 
During the implementation process, such intricacies 
provide opportunities and constraints for multiple ac-
tors, and these actors invoke different images of legit-
imacy to pursue their preferences. It was shown that 
boundaries between internal and external legitimacy 
are redrawn towards the former, yet without living up 
the normative standards of expert deliberation and jus-
tification associated with internal legitimacy. Although 
this affects the acceptability of decision outcomes in 
general, some actors nevertheless enjoy preferential 
access to decision making bodies. The resulting insuffi-
ciency of legitimacy is due to the alteration of rules and 
procedures of decision making during the implementa-
tion of the authorisation procedure. The empirical ma-
terial presented here is thus important for comple-
menting the vast literature on REACH, as it sheds light 
on the way ambiguous legislative provisions are mate-
rialized in the implementation process. 
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